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1 Introduction
There is often uncertainty surrounding the social effects of new products or production tech-
niques that firms have developed and would like to market or use. For instance, a pharmaceutical
company may be willing to sell a drug, which may or may not entail serious side effects. Or
an energy firm may adopt a new drilling technique which allows extracting oil where it was
not possible before, but this extraction technique may cause some substantial damages to the
environment. The possible presence of negative externalities creates a need for regulation: ide-
ally, only the production or the adoption of those activities for which private benefits outweigh
expected social costs ought to be authorized. Unfortunately, there might not be conclusive ev-
idence about the expected externalities associated with such activities. When this is the case,
a benevolent regulator faces the choice between two suboptimal regimes. A regime of lenient
authorization whereby an activity is authorized unless conclusive evidence that it is socially
harmful is collected, and a regime of strict authorization whereby an activity is authorized only
if conclusive evidence that it is socially beneficial is collected.
In the real world, new products or technologies which may cause harm to the public are
regulated differently according to their potential negative repercussions. In the case of drugs or
vaccines, the risk for public safety can be extremely high.1 Accordingly, in most countries there is
an intense scrutiny before drugs can be marketed to ensure that they do not present serious risks
for patients (for an international comparison of drug approval procedures, see Mulaje, 2013).
Even if they often claim to treat illnesses or promise to enhance mental or sexual performance,
dietary supplements are not as tightly regulated as medicines. In the U.S., following the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act in 1994, dietary supplements are regarded as a special
category of food and, consequently, are not reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) before they are marketed to prove that they are safe and effective.2 For innovation in
other fields, the approach followed by countries or states differ. For instance, consider hydraulic
fracturing for which wide scientific consensus on environmental hazard is currently lacking.
In France and Vermont the regulator has adopted a strict authorization regime invoking the
precautionary principle, which states that an activity should be prohibited in the absence of
1In 1937, a preparation called Elixir Sulfanilamide, which had not undergone safety studies caused the deaths
of more than 100 people in the U.S. and is believed to have hastened the enactment of the 1938 Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (see Ballentine, 1981).
2Unlike prescription drugs and over-the counter medicines, dietary supplements do not go through clinical
trials before being sold. The FDA can only take the supplements off the market if they are found to be dangerous
or if the manufacturers make claims that turn out to be false and misleading (see FDA own website). Recently, the
FDA announced its intention to strengthen its oversight of this booming industry and warned several supplement
makers that had improperly marketed their products as treatments for diseases such as the Alzheimer’s. (see
“FDA challenges supplement makers’ marketing claims”, on the Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019).
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conclusive scientific evidence proving that it is not socially harmful.3,4 Other countries and
states, especially those which are oil rich like Texas, generally allow using hydraulic fracturing,
despite the absence of conclusive evidence on its environmental impact.
In this paper, we develop a simple model to study the optimal design of regulation of inno-
vative activities which can have negative social repercussions. In doing so, we take into account
that not only do these regulatory regimes impact on production choices, but they may also af-
fect those investment decisions that ultimately lead to the development of innovative activities.
Moreover, we also consider how the possibility of corruption of public officials impacts on the
optimal regulatory design. While there is a large literature in economics studying the optimal
regulatory design when activities generate negative externalities, few papers have considered
how regulation impacts on investment decisions. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, none
has investigated the role played by the possibility of corruption in shaping the choice of the
optimal regulatory regime for innovative activities.
Corruption plays a prominent role in determining the socially desirable regulatory regime
because of the large private benefits that the actors involved could split. The phenomenon of
regulatory capture is rife and its consequences can be devastating. For instance, the FDA’s slow
response to the opioid epidemic in the U.S. has been linked to the excessive proximity of the
agency to pharmaceutical companies that stood to gain billions of dollars.5 More in general,
the pharmaceutical industry’s interest in capturing regulators cannot be downplayed. The FDA
advisory committees and panels that wield an enormous influence over the agency’s approval
decisions consist of renowned scientists and researchers who should be independent. While the
expert members usually do not have potential conflicts of interests at the time the decisions are
made, later they often receive payments or financial support from the regulated firms, as it has
been recently highlighted by Piller (2018).6 This widespread practice questions the impartiality
of the advice provided by the panelists. Importantly, regulatory capture is not a phenomenon
confined to developed countries. Developing countries may find it difficult to prevent capture
due to their limited budgets, lower-skilled human resources, and lower accountability (for a dis-
cussion, see Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009, and references therein). Indeed, for these countries,
there is ample anecdotal evidence documenting how public officials engaged in the regulation
3There are several definitions of the precautionary principle, which is often invoked in international treatises.
A notable definition is provided in the 1992’s Rio Declaration on environment and development, whose Principle
15 reads: “... Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” For an economic
interpretation of the precautionary principle, see Immordino (2003).
4For the France’s and Vermont’s bans on hydraulic fracturing see “France cements fracking ban” on The
Guardian, October 11, 2013, and Vermont H.464 (Act 152) “An act relating to hydraulic fracturing wells for
natural gas and oil production” signed by the State Governor on May 16, 2012, respectively.
5It is believed that the crisis is related to the frequent prescription of opioids to treat illnesses other than
those for which they have been approved by the FDA. E.g., see “F.D.A. did not intervene to curb risky fentanyl
prescriptions” on The New York Times, August 2, 2018, for details on the story and FDA’s inactivity.
6Of 107 physician advisors who voted on FDA advisory committees during the period 2013-2016, 26 later
received more than $100, 000 from drugmakers or competing firms (in payments or research funding).
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or authorization of new products and techniques receive bribes to expedite and smooth the
approval process.7
Interestingly, corruption opportunities differ between the two regulatory regimes: under
lenient authorization, the public official in charge of approving production may conceal evidence
unfavorable to the firm in exchange for a bribe. This collusive agreement would lead to excessive
production and spur excessive investment. In contrast, under strict authorization, the public
official may be willing to blackmail the firm, demanding some money under the threat that
evidence favorable to the firm will be concealed if the firm refuses to give in. This does not
affect allocative efficiency but discourages investment.
In the model, we consider a firm which must decide whether or not to invest resources to
develop an innovative product. If the firm manages to innovate, the good may be socially
beneficial or harmful, in the sense that social costs more than offset private benefits. We assume
that a benevolent regulator can send a public official to collect evidence on the social harm
that the innovative activity may cause. The evidence may or may not be conclusive, though,
and, to make matters worse, the public official may be able to conceal the information he has
found, which gives rise to corruption opportunities. The regulator chooses between the two
alternative authorization regimes to maximize social welfare, taking into account the different
types of corruption they engender.
Compared to lenient authorization, strict authorization is a more prudent approach because
it never approves production of socially harmful goods. This upside comes at the cost of a
loss of opportunity: production of goods which are socially beneficial will not be authorized
when conclusive evidence is not available. When the potential negative repercussions on society
outweigh such loss of opportunity, the regime of strict authorization is preferred. Notably, strict
authorization is more likely to be preferred when corruption is more commonplace. Corruption
dramatically exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of
socially harmful goods would always be authorized. In turn, this spurs the firm to invest more,
thereby magnifying the over-investment problem which owes to the firm’s disregard for the
activity’s negative externalities. In contrast, corruption under strict authorization does not
affect allocative efficiency but solely the distribution of the gains stemming from authorizing
production of safe goods between the public official and the firm. Furthermore, corruption
discourages investment as the firm anticipates that it will have to share the proceeds of the
activity with the public official and this may attenuate an over-investment problem.8
In the second part of the paper, we explore several measures that could be adopted to
improve the regulatory outcome. Firstly, we study report-based payments to the public officials
to induce truthful reporting. We find that such incentive payments are more useful under lenient
7For instance, see “China jails former drug regulatory official for taking bribes: state media” on Reuters,
January 3, 2017 where it is reported that a former official of the China Food and Drug Administration was jailed
for accepting bribes to smooth drug approval processes.
8Over-investment may occur in a regime of strict authorization although production will not be allowed when
there is no conclusive evidence that the good is safe, since the firm does not take into account the negative
externalities at the investment stage.
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authorization where corruption is a more vexing issue. However, preventing corruption may
require giving up large rents to the public officials, making such schemes politically infeasible.
Conversely, deterring corruption is less costly under strict authorization, since the extortion
threat can be made empty by paying a small bonus for an informative report. Yet, the regulator
may prefer not to prevent extortion as corruption may turn out to be welfare-enhancing in this
regime. Secondly, we show how the ability to impose a tax on innovative activities and coordinate
taxes with regulatory evidence strengthens the case for lenient authorization. If the tax can be
made contingent solely on production, then the firm will have a lower tax burden the higher the
likelihood of facing a corrupt public official. By properly tailoring the tax to such probability,
the firm can be made to internalize the negative externalities the activity may generate and
welfare will be unaffected by the likelihood of corruption. If the tax can be made contingent on
the evidence collected by the public official, a regime of lenient authorization is always optimal.
Intuitively, under such regime it is always possible to replicate the outcome achievable under
strict authorization by adequately setting the tax. Lastly, we study ex-post liability, showing
that unbounded fines make regulation redundant. If fines are bounded, regulation is still needed
and we find that courts are valuable only if ex-post there are additional informative signals
about product safety that can mitigate investment inefficiency.
Related Literature. Our paper relates to different strands of the economics literature on
regulation. At least since the seminal paper by Becker and Stigler (1974), economists have
taken into account how the possibility that enforcers can engage in corruption affects the design
of regulatory institutions. Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) study
the optimal compensation policy for tax collectors and inspectors, respectively. The former
find that paying the tax collectors efficiency wages, which deter collusion with certainty, may
not be optimal. The latter study linear incentive pay and highlight that small increases in
such rewards may backfire, because they may lead to higher bribes. Acemoglu and Verdier
(2000) develop a more general framework to study the resources that should be devoted to
correct externalities when bureaucrats can be corrupt. They provide some relevant insights
on government intervention and income levels. Immordino and Pagano (2010) compare the
regulatory standard chosen by benevolent and self-interested regulators when public officials
can be corrupt and find evidence consistent with the benevolent regulator’s model. Hiriart
et al. (2010) show that ex-ante and ex-post monitors, i.e. regulators and courts, should be
two separate entities and determine the set of transfers and fines which deter collusion. In our
model, we study the design of regulation in a world of incomplete contracts where corruption is
an equilibrium phenomenon. In Section 4, we explore alternative instruments that the regulator
could adopt to improve the regulatory outcome, including transfers paid to the public officials
in order to motivate information disclosure.
In the paper, we compare alternative regulatory regimes, taking into account their effects
on both production and investment incentives. How regulation affects allocative efficiency and
investment decision has recently attracted scholarly attention. In particular, Anderlini et al.
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(2013) compare flexible and rigid legal regimes. In the former the regulatory standard is decided
after the R&D investment has been made, whereas in the latter it is decided ex-ante. Calzo-
lari and Immordino (2005) explore the role of lobbies in providing valuable information about
the safety of innovative products. They find that lobbies tied to innovative producers have an
advantage in providing truthful information as compared to lobbies linked with producers of
traditional goods. In their analysis, there are neither corruption opportunities nor an indepen-
dent agency collecting evidence on product safety. Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2013) assume
that both regulators and courts can collect information about product safety and investigate
whether authorization from the regulatory body should provide firms with safe harbor from
future negligence penalties. They find that this is indeed the case if social returns to activities
are sufficiently large. Our paper is more closely related to Immordino et al. (2011) who assume
that there might not be conclusive evidence about product safety and compare lenient and strict
authorization regimes which provide firms with different incentives to innovate and produce.9
Our contribution to this ongoing debate on the optimal regulatory regime is to explicitly allow
for corruption and to highlight how different instruments should be profitably tailored in this
context to align private and social interests. Lastly, akin to us, Harstad and Svensson (2011)
allow for corruption in a model where regulation affects investment incentives. In addition to
bending the rules to avoid compliance costs (bribery), they also allow for lobbying, that is,
spending resources to relax existing rules. In their model, there is no uncertainty about the
magnitude of the externality and there is no comparison of alternative authorization regimes.
Outline. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the set-up and
presents two benchmarks. Section 3 carries out the positive analysis of the set-up. Section 4
explores several instruments that can be available to the regulator to improve the regulatory
outcome. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2 Setup
A profit-maximizing firm (it) must decide the level of R&D expenditures to develop a new
production technology or a marketable product. The problem of the benevolent regulator (he)
is to decide whether or not to authorize the use of the innovation which may exhibit negative
externalities. At the beginning of the game, the regulator commits to a policy, being aware of
its incentive effects on the firm’s investment decision.
In stage 1, the firm decides on the innovation intensity I ∈ [0, 1], which coincides with the
probability of a breakthrough, at cost cI
2
2 with c > 0. If no innovation is discovered, the firm
produces a standard good which gives profits normalized to 0. If innovation is successful, the
firm can produce the new product which would yield gross profits Π. In stage 2, neither the firm
9See also Immordino and Polo (2014) who compare different legal standards, which determine the conditions
under which a practice is unlawful, and the enforcement policy, namely the sanctioning rule if the firm is found
guilty.
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nor the regulator know whether the good is socially beneficial or not. However, it is common
knowledge that the activity will generate an expected harm (or negative externality) h, which
is distributed on the interval [0, H] according to the distribution G(·), with continuous density
g(·) on (0, H). It holds that H > Π > 0. Therefore, the innovation is socially harmful, and
the good should not be produced, if h > Π. In this case, we say that the state is unsafe.
Conversely, if h ≤ Π, that is, the state is safe, the innovation would be socially beneficial, even
though it may generate some negative externalities. Throughout, we assume that c ≥ Π, which
guarantees that I ≤ 1 in equilibrium. This requires the marginal cost of the investment in R&D
to be sufficiently large so that the firm would never make sure that a breakthrough is achieved
with probability 1.10 In what follows, it will often be useful to compare activities which involve
different harm distributions on [0, H]. Specifically, consider two distribution F (·) and G(·) on
[0, H]. We will say that the activity identified by distribution F (·) is more harmful than the
activity identified by distribution G(·) if distribution F (·) conditionally stochastically dominates
distribution GB(·), that is:
f(h)
F (h)
≥ g(h)
G(h)
for all h ∈ (0, H). (1)
This means that the first-order stochastic dominance relation holds for every left-tail distribu-
tion.
2.1 Benchmarks
We consider two benchmarks against which alternative regulatory regimes must be compared.
First, we illustrate the first-best outcome that would be achieved if a benevolent regulator
could control investment and production choices directly. Such regulator would produce only if
the innovation were socially beneficial, namely in the safe state. Therefore, first-best investment
is determined from:
I∗ = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh− cI
2
2
,
so that the optimal investment is:
I∗ =
∫ Π
0 (Π− h)g(h)dh
c
. (2)
The optimal investment is increasing in the probability that the good is safe and the net social
benefit of the safe product. A higher marginal cost of innovation reduces the optimal investment.
Expected social welfare in this first-best world is:
W ∗ =
(∫ Π
0 (Π− h)g(h)dh
)2
2c
. (3)
The second benchmark we contemplate is a regime of laissez-faire, namely one where the regula-
tor never intervenes. Being unfettered, the innovative firm would always produce an innovative
10With the sole exception of the case in which Π = c and the firm is always allowed to produce and reaps all
the profits.
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product, irrespective of its social repercussions. Under laissez-faire, the investment in innovation
is determined from the following expression:
ILF = arg max
I∈[0,1]
IΠ− cI
2
2
,
which yields
ILF =
Π
c
≤ 1. (4)
Comparing (4) to (2) it is immediate to see that whenever the activity generates some negative
externality there would be too much investment from a social viewpoint. Social welfare in a
regime of laissez-faire is:
WLF =
Π
[
Π− 2
( ∫ H
0 hg(h)dh
)]
2c
. (5)
The rationale for regulation of innovative activities is provided by the positive wedge existing
between (5) and (3). A regime of laissez-faire would give rise to excessive innovation and lead
to production even when the newly-developed product is socially harmful.
Note that if a benevolent regulator could outright prohibit or authorize innovative activities
but could not obtain evidence of the product safety, its guidelines should be the following:
innovation activities should be allowed only if Π ≥ 2Eg(h), where Eg(h) :=
∫ H
0 hg(h)dh. As a
result, innovative activities would be more likely to be per-se legal when the externality that
they are expected to bring about is lower.
3 Regulation of Innovative Activities
In this section, we assume that the regulator can send a public official (she) to collect evidence
about the social benefits of the innovative good, i.e. whether it is socially harmful or not, after
a breakthrough occurs. Conclusive evidence about the social repercussions of producing the
good is found with probability p < 1. Specifically, the public official observes the true level
of harm with probability p and does not collect any conclusive evidence with complementary
probability 1−p.11 The regulator can condition the authorization of production on the evidence
reported by the public official. As mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish between two
authorization regimes. In a lenient authorization regime, the firm is allowed to produce unless
there is conclusive evidence that the good is unsafe. In a strict authorization regime, the firm
is allowed to produce only if there is conclusive evidence that the good is safe. The difference
between the two approaches emerges when there is no conclusive evidence about the social harm
which can be caused by the production of the good. Our aim is to determine the optimal
authorization regime and relate it to the severity of the corruption concerns.12
11We can relax this assumption. For instance, all results go through if we assume that with probability p the
public official observes a signal h˜ = h + , where  is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and
variance σ2 > 0.
12We do not allow for mixed authorization regimes, whereby the firm is allowed to produce only if the reported
social harm is below some threshold different from Π. This restriction can be justified by noticing that such mixed
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3.1 Honest public officials
Suppose first that there are no corruption opportunities. For instance, the benevolent regulator
himself collects evidence about the social effects of producing the good.
Lenient authorization. In a regime of lenient authorization, production of beneficial goods
will always be allowed, whereas production of socially harmful goods will be prohibited with
probability p. Therefore, lenient authorization may lead to type-II errors, namely approval of
production of unsafe goods. In this authorization regime, the firm’s investment decision in stage
1 solves:
ILA = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
[
p
∫ Π
0
Πg(h)dh+ (1− p)Π
]
− cI
2
2
.
Therefore, the optimal investment satisfies the following:
ILA =
[
1− p(1−G(Π))
]
Π
c
. (6)
Investment is always above the first-best level, although it is lower than the one that would be
chosen in a regime of laissez-faire if ILA < 1. The level of welfare attained in a regime of lenient
authorization is given by:
WLA = ILA
[
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh+ (1− p)
∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wLA
−c(I
LA)2
2
, (7)
where wLA represents the surplus due to activity authorization. Note that (7) can also be
written as:
WLA =
[
(1− p) + pG(Π)
]2
Π2
2c
−
[
1− p+ pG(Π)
]
Π
c
[
(1− p)Eg(h) + p
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
]
.
The following lemma carries out some comparative statics on ILA and WLA.
Lemma 1. An increase in p reduces investment and increases welfare. More harmful ac-
tivities always lead to lower investment and unambiguously decrease welfare if
∫ Π
0 hf(h)dh ≥∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh, where F (·) conditionally stochastically dominates G(·) for all h ∈ (0, H).
A higher precision of the signal collected by the public official unambiguously increases
welfare because it reduces the likelihood that unsafe products will be authorized. This attenuates
the over-investment problem and improves the set of activities that are produced. More harmful
activities reduce the probability of producing the good and, as a result, lead the firm to invest
less. Furthermore, they always adversely affect welfare unless they also reduce the surplus
associated with the authorization of safe activities.
regimes are not “renegotiation-proof”, that is, the regulator cannot commit to ban (authorize) activities that are
socially beneficial (harmful). Put differently, if there is conclusive evidence that Π > (<)h, the regulator must
authorize (prohibit) production.
10
Strict authorization. If authorization is strict, socially harmful goods are never produced
but some socially beneficial goods may be prohibited too. In other words, strict authorization
may lead to type-I errors, namely prohibition of production of safe goods. The firm’s investment
decision at stage 1 solves:
ISA = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
[
p
∫ Π
0
Πg(h)dh
]
− cI
2
2
.
Therefore:
ISA =
pΠG(Π)
c
. (8)
A higher p increases the probability that evidence that the good is safe is uncovered allowing
production. Therefore, a higher p is associated with a higher investment. Accordingly, the
equilibrium investment is greater than the first-best level when p is sufficiently high:
p >
∫ Π
0 G(h)dh
G(Π)Π
.
Welfare that would arise in a regime of strict authorization is:
WSA = ISA
[
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
− c(I
SA)2
2
. (9)
Note that the above expression can also be rewritten as:
WSA =
[pG(Π)Π]2
2c
− p
2G(Π)Π
c
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh.
Comparative statics on ISA and WSA is illustrated below.
Lemma 2. A higher p always increases investment, whereas it positively affects welfare only if:
Π ≥ 2Eg(h|h ≤ Π).
More harmful activities depress investment and reduce welfare.
When then signal is more precise, there is a higher chance that a safe product is authorized,
which boosts the firm’s investment incentives. A more accurate signal is also beneficial for wel-
fare when the gross profits Π are substantially larger than the expected negative externality
caused by the authorized activity. More harmful activities are detrimental to investment and
welfare: for a given Π, production will be authorized less often and its associated surplus will
be lower.
The optimal second-best regime in the absence of corruption is determined by comparing
WSA and WLA. In Proposition 1, we show under what condition the regime of lenient autho-
rization is preferred to one of strict authorization.
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Proposition 1. When all public officials are honest, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime
of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if:
Π ≥ 2
(
(1− p+ pG(Π))Eg(h) + p
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
1− p+ 2pG(Π)
)
.
A marginal increase in p makes it more likely that lenient authorization is preferred to strict
authorization if Eg(h|h ≥ Π) ≥ Eg(h|h ≤ Π). More harmful activities make strict authorization
more desirable if ∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh ≥
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh,
where F (·) conditionally stochastically dominates G(·) for all h ∈ (0, H).
Proposition 1 shows that lenient authorization is preferred when the net social benefit of the
safe product is above a threshold value. Consider that strict authorization is a more prudent
approach because an unsafe product is never produced. However, it entails some costs due to
the lost opportunity of producing a safe product when there is no conclusive evidence of its
effects on society and
∫ Π
0 (Π−h)g(h)dh measures the value of such lost opportunity. In contrast,
lenient authorization is a more daring approach because the good may be produced despite
being unsafe. Accordingly, this regime fosters R&D investment, but it entails a high cost for
the society when the unsafe product is authorized in the absence of conclusive evidence of its
negative social repercussions. For activities which are relatively less harmful, the benevolent
regulator should be more inclined to use a lenient authorization regime not to lose out on the
opportunities they entail.13 A more accurate signal reduces the probability that unsafe goods
are authorized under lenient authorization, whereas it raises that chances that safe goods are
approved under strict authorization. As a result, an increase in p makes lenient authorization
relatively more desirable than strict authorization if the expected benefits of avoiding production
of unsafe goods outweigh the expected benefits of producing safe goods.
3.2 Corrupt public officials
Is the optimal design of regulation affected by the presence of corruptible public officials? The
assumption that all public officials are incorruptible and pursue the public good may be far-
fetched. As argued in the introduction, capture of public officials who can grant approval of new
products or processes is rife, especially in countries with weak institutions. In this subsection,
we deal with the other polar, and admittedly unrealistic, case in which public officials are all
corruptible.
In the analysis that follows we assume that a corruptible public official may be willing to
conceal conclusive evidence about the social effects of the innovation in exchange for an amount
13Drugs which show promise in treating serious conditions and fill unmet medical needs
can be granted earlier approval through the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Program (see
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/healthprofessionals/ucm313768.htm). This is consistent with
the result that activities which may exhibit greater social benefits should not be subject to a strict authorization
regime.
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of money b paid by the firm. Clearly, this is a short-cut to model the phenomena of corruption
and regulatory capture. Bribes may take various forms which include, but are not limited to,
direct monetary transfers. Other forms can be non-monetary gifts, the promise of a future
full-time job or side-hustle for the public official or for a relative, and other exchanges of favors.
Following Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1991), we say that the information collected
by the public official is hard. This implies that conclusive evidence cannot be forged. That is,
a public official who has not obtained conclusive evidence cannot report that she has observed
the level of expected harm the activity would bring about. However, evidence can be concealed,
i.e., if the public official has observed h, she can report either h or nothing.
We make the following assumptions concerning how the collusion sub-game plays out. The
parties are assumed to have symmetric information about the evidence collected by the public
official and bargain cooperatively according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution in which
the firm receives a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the gains from collusion. We further assume that the side-
contract between the parties is perfectly enforceable.14
The two authorization regimes have remarkable implications for the types of corruption
opportunities. We denote the solutions when public officials are corrupt by the subscript C.
Lenient authorization. In a lenient-authorization regime, the parties could negotiate a bribe
in exchange of which the public official conceals evidence that the good is socially harmful, since
the lack of decisive information about the good does not prevent production. In other words, this
authorization regime is exposed to the issue of collusion. The firm’s threat point is nil because,
if the information is revealed, the firm will not be allowed to produce the good. Similarly, the
public official’s threat point is zero because she does receive the same salary - which we have
normalized to zero - irrespective of the content of the report. Therefore, the bribe solves the
following:
b = arg max
b∈R
b1−α(Π− b)α,
whose solution gives bLAC = (1 − α)Π and the public official only enjoys (1 − α)Π. Since there
are obvious gains from colluding, production will always be allowed, even when there is evidence
revealing that the good is socially harmful. However, in deciding the investment level, the firm
will take into account that, in the case of a breakthrough, with probability βp the public official
will authorize production but will reap a fraction (1 − α) of the net private gains. Therefore,
the investment decision will be made to maximize the following:
ILAC = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
[
p
∫ Π
0
Πg(h)dh+ (1− p)Π + pα
∫ H
Π
Πg(h)dh
]
− cI
2
2
.
As a result, the investment in innovation satisfies:
ILAC =
[1− p(1−G(Π))(1− α)]Π
c
. (10)
14There are several complementary mechanisms which can ensure that the parties will adhere to the side-
contract, that we leave exogenous and we do not explicitly model. These include reputation, emotions, and
reciprocity, and are discussed in the literature on corruption in hierarchies. For instance, see Tirole (1992), Vafa¨ı
(2002), and Vafa¨ı (2010).
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If α = 1, namely if the firm holds all the bargaining power, the investment decision is the
same as under laissez-faire. A lower α has a negative impact on the firm’s investment choice
because it means that the profit share accruing to the public official is larger. Irrespective of the
value taken by α, there is always over-investment in this regime. Welfare in a regime of lenient
authorization is:
WLAC = I
LA
C
[ ∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
− cI
LA
C
2
. (11)
Replacing the value of ILAC found in (10), we get:
WLAC =
[1− p(1−G(Π))(1− α)]Π
c
(
[1 + p(1−G(Π))(1− α)]Π
2
− Eg(h)
)
.
For activities which are more harmful, the consequences of granting authorization are more
socially detrimental but the over-investment problem is less prominent. As expected, the pres-
ence of corrupt public officials causes a reduction in social welfare when authorization is lenient,
because it magnifies the over-investment problem and leads to excessive production.
Strict authorization. With strict authorization, bribery may occur if the public official has
collected conclusive evidence that is favorable to the firm: By concealing such information, the
firm would not be allowed to produce. Hence, in this regime, corruption takes the form of
extortion or blackmail. The public official would be willing to follow through on her threat
to conceal evidence if the parties do not find an agreement because she is indifferent between
reporting truthfully and concealing the collected evidence. However, since there is evidence
available showing that the good would be socially beneficial, we also assume that the firm can
appeal the public official’s decision and with probability γ ∈ [0, 1] it wins and is allowed to
produce. The public official does not suffer any loss if the firm wins the appeal. The parameter
γ represents the strength of the country’s institutions and higher values imply that the public
official is able to extract less surplus in the bargaining with the firm. In particular, the firm
knows that if bargaining with the public official breaks down, it can appeal the decision, getting
γΠ. Therefore, better institutions improve the firm’s threat point in the bargaining with the
public official. The bribe will be determined from the following:
b = arg max
b∈R
b1−α[(1− γ)Π− b]α,
which leads to bSAC = (1− α)(1− γ)Π. The investment decision is determined by the following
expression:
ISAC = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
(
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− bSAC )g(h)dh
)
− cI
2
2
,
that is, replacing the value of bSAC :
ISAC = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
(
p
∫ Π
0
[γ + α(1− γ)]Πg(h)dh
)
− cI
2
2
.
The firm anticipates that if the investment is successful, it will be allowed to produce the good
only if conclusive evidence is found. However, the firm will reap only a fraction γ + α(1− γ) of
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the benefits. Therefore, if α = 1, the firm is in the same situation as when the public official
is always honest, whereas it only obtains a fraction γ of the profits if α = 0. The equilibrium
investment level satisfies:
ISAC =
p[γ + α(1− γ)]G(Π)Π
c
. (12)
Welfare gives:
WSAC = I
SA
C
(
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
)
− c(I
SA
C )
2
2
. (13)
Replacing the value of ISAC , welfare can be rewritten as:
WSAC =
p[γ + α(1− γ)]G(Π)Π
c
pG(Π)
[
1 + (1− γ)(1− α)
]
Π
2
− p
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
 .
Social welfare attainable in a regime of strict authorization is affected by the possibility of cor-
ruption. As a result, both the bargaining power distribution and the strength of the institutions
matter for welfare purposes. A more accurate signal p has a dampened effect on investment in-
centives because a share of the gross profits is reaped by the corrupt public official. Conversely,
a higher p continues to increase the likelihood that a safe product is authorized. Accordingly,
when there is corruption, the threshold value above which p has a positive impact on welfare is
lower.15
As stated in the following proposition, strict authorization dominates lenient authorization
when Π is sufficiently small.
Proposition 2. When public officials are corrupt, the regulator prefers a regime of lenient
authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if the following inequality holds:
Π ≥ 2[1− p(1−G(Π))(1− α)]Eg(h) + p
2[γ + α(1− γ)]G(Π) ∫ Π0 G(h)dh
1− p2
[
(G(Π))2 + (1− α)2[1− (2− γ)G(Π)][1− γG(Π)]
] .
In a regime of strict authorization, corruption may turn out to be good for welfare. To
understand why, consider that even in a regime of strict authorization there might be over-
investment as the firm does not internalize the external effects caused by production. When
public officials are corrupt, the firm is less willing to invest because it anticipates that it will
enjoy only a fraction of the gains from production. Therefore, corruption acts in the same fashion
as an indirect tax, mitigating the over-investment problem and leading to higher welfare.
In Figures 1 and 2, we graphically compare social welfare in the two regimes as a function
of p.16 The solid (dashed) lines represent welfare when public officials are all honest (corrupt).
Given the parametric assumptions, welfare rises in both regimes with the probability of finding
conclusive evidence, p. In the absence of corruption, a meaningful difference between lenient
15We formally prove this claim in the proof of Proposition 2.
16In drawing the figures, we have assumed that the distribution of h has a point mass at 0 to lessen the
expected negative externality caused by the activity. This stands in contrast to what is assumed in the model
and is done for illustrative purposes only. Relaxing this distributional assumption in the analysis would make the
computations more cumbersome without qualitatively affecting the results.
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and strict authorization arises when the signal is not very precise. Indeed, when p tends to 1,
welfare in the two regimes coincide. Corruption unequivocally reduces the benefits of lenient
authorization, whereas it might be beneficial under strict authorization, as in the cases illustrated
in the figures.
When the expected harm is relatively low as compared to the gains stemming from produc-
tion, it is socially desirable to adopt lenient authorization. Being a more daring approach, lenient
authorization allows enjoying the benefits of production more frequently. This is so unless there
is corruption, in which case the shortcomings of lenient authorization (excessive production and
overinvestment) are exacerbated, which make strict authorization more attractive. This sce-
nario is illustrated in Figure 1: Lenient authorization always outperforms strict authorization in
the absence of corruption. Instead, if public officials are corrupt, strict authorization becomes
socially desirable when the signal is accurate enough (i.e., for p ≥ 0.664).
In contrast, when the expected negative externality is relatively high as compared to the
benefits of production, it is better to ban production of innovative activities when the signal
is not very accurate. As a matter of fact, welfare under lenient authorization may even be
negative. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 2, wherein lenient authorization outperforms
strict authorization only if there is no corruption and p is sufficiently high (i.e., higher than
0.444).
p
W
0
0.5
10.664
WLA
WLAC
WSA
WSAC
Figure 1: Welfare in the different authorization regimes. The figure is drawn assuming the following values for
the parameters: Π = 5, c = 5, α = 0.5, γ = 0.5 and h has a point mass of 0.25 at 0 and is distributed according
to the Uniform Distribution on (0, H], where H = 6.
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pW
0
0.5
10.444
0.3125
WLA
WLAC
WSA
WSAC
Figure 2: Welfare in the different authorization regimes. The figure is drawn assuming the following values for
the parameters: Π = 5, c = 5, α = 0.5, γ = 0.5 and h has a point mass of 0.25 at 0 and is distributed according
to the Uniform Distribution on (0, H], where H = 7.5.
3.3 Heterogeneous public officials
Now we carry out the analysis for the more general and realistic setting in which only a fraction
of the public officials are corruptible. In particular, we assume that a public official is honest with
probability υ ∈ [0, 1] so as to encompass the cases described in the previous subsections. The
public official’s type is her private information and the firm learns her type at the bargaining
stage. Akin to Besley and McLaren (1993), we make the assumption that preference for an
honest behavior is immutable. This implies that an honest public official values her integrity
more than any bribe she could extract from the firm. In contrast, a dishonest public official is
merely interested in maximizing her income.
In both regimes, the pervasiveness of corruption in the population has an indirect effect on
welfare through its impact on the firm’s investment incentives. In a regime of lenient authoriza-
tion, corruption also worsens the pool of products which are authorized. Before studying the
overall impact of corruption on welfare, it is useful to define the following function:
Γ ≡ υ + (1− υ)[γ(1− α) + α].
The above function Γ represents the fraction of the gross benefits Π that accrues to the firm if
there is evidence that the good is safe in a regime of strict authorization. It is immediate to see
that Γ is increasing in all its arguments: that is, the higher the fraction of honest public officials,
the stronger the institutions, the larger the share of the corruption gains which are seized by
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the firm, the higher Γ. Proposition 3 shows the impact of a change in the likelihood of facing
an honest public official, υ, on welfare in the two regimes and represents one of the chief results
of the paper.
Proposition 3. The impact of an increase in υ on welfare
(a) is always positive in a regime of lenient authorization;
(b) is negative in a regime of strict authorization if
Γ >
∫ Π
0 (Π− h)g(h)dh∫ Π
0 Πg(h)dh
, (14)
where this inequality is more likely to hold when the activity is more harmful.
This section has shown that corruption plays a very critical role in determining which regu-
latory regime to adopt. While corruption is always detrimental to welfare under lenient autho-
rization, it may actually be beneficial under strict authorization.
In a regime of lenient authorization, a higher fraction of honest public officials in the popu-
lation increases the chances that an unsafe product will be prohibited. In addition to improving
ex-post efficiency, an increase in υ also mitigates the over-investment problem that affects the
lenient authorization regime. This is because the firm anticipates that production will be au-
thorized less often. Therefore, there is an unambiguously positive relationship between υ and
welfare in a regime of lenient authorization.
More surprisingly, in a regime of strict authorization, welfare may be adversely affected
by an increase in the fraction of honest public officials. Note first that υ does not affect the
authorization outcome but only the distribution of the gains between the firm and the public
official. In this regime, a higher level of υ encourages R&D investment as the firm anticipates
that it will be more likely that it will reap all the gains stemming from the innovation when
there is evidence that the product is safe. For this reason, an increase in υ may exacerbate an
over-investment problem. This negative effect on welfare is more likely to occur when Γ is high.
Intuitively, the higher the fraction of the gross benefits that the firm obtains, the more likely it
is that there is an overinvestment from a social standpoint. Therefore, an increase in υ (or in
γ or α) magnifies the over-investment problem when Γ is already large enough. Therefore, one
should be wary of institutional improvements that increase the value of these parameters (e.g.,
γ) as they may backfire. An increase in υ is more likely to have a detrimental effect on welfare
for more harmful activities. Intuitively, stimulating investment is less desirable when its social
return is lower. Referring to Figures 1 and 2, for those values of the parameters, the level of
welfare in the regime of lenient (respectively, strict) authorization as a function of β is a curve
which lies between WLAC and W
LA (resp., WSAC and W
SA).
4 Additional Policy Instruments
In this section, we examine separately how bonuses, taxation, and liability could be used to
improve the regulatory outcome.
18
4.1 Wage policy
In the previous section, we did not solve for the optimal corruption-proof mechanism, that
is, we did not work out a system of report-contingent transfers paid to the public official to
preempt corruption. Despite the well-established argument made in their favor in the economics
literature, such schemes are little used in practice. According to some scholars, such schemes
might be infeasible because of the very high payments to public servants they might entail (see
Dal Bo´, 2006, and Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). We abstract from this implementation issue
below and we study the features of the optimal salary schemes.
We assume that the regulator announces non-negative salaries to the public official which
are contingent on the report, sr ≥ 0, where r ∈ {h, ∅}. In line with the existing literature in
regulation (e.g., see Laffont and Tirole, 1993), we assume that paying 1$ salary to the public
official costs (1 + λ)$ to the regulator, where the parameter λ ≥ 0 represents the inefficiency
associated with raising public funds. We discuss in turn how the wage policy should be designed
in the two authorization regimes. We focus on the more general scenario developed in Section
3.3 and we denote the solutions by the subscript G.
Lenient authorization. In this regime, the regulator may want to induce corruptible public
officials to report evidence that the activity is unsafe. As a result, without loss of generality, we
can impose s∅ = 0 and sh = 0 for all h < Π. The stake of corruption in this regime is equal to Π,
the gross profit the firm obtains if production is allowed when there is evidence of its unsafety.
Therefore, to induce a corruptible public official who has observed h ≥ Π to truthfully report
this information, it must be that the salary she receives is at least Π. In order to completely
weed out corruption, the regulator should pay sh = Π whenever h ∈ [Π, H]. However, this
policy may be unappealing if λ > 0 and all the more so if the fraction υ of the public officials
in the population is larger. This is because honest public officials need not receive a reward to
truthfully report evidence. In what follows, we maintain two assumptions. First, the regulator
would ban production if the surplus the activity generates, wG, were negative. Second, we make
the following parametric assumption.
Assumption 1. For all h ∈ [0, H], it holds that g(h) + hg′(h) > 0.
This assumption is always satisfied if G(·) is (weakly) convex or if it is not overly concave.
Its implication is that the regulator prioritizes deterring corruption for larger than smaller states
of the world as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The regulator prefers to prevent corruption for larger than smaller states.
When the difference between the expected externality and the firm’s gross profit is not very
large, the regulator may prefer to tolerate collusion. That is, if the regulator ever tolerates col-
lusion, he prefers that the welfare loss is minimized. In the maximization problem, we determine
the threshold level hL ∈ [Π, H] above which collusion is prevented.
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Proposition 4. In a regime of lenient authorization, the regulator sets a salary sh = Π for all
h ∈ [hL, H] and sh = s∅ = 0 otherwise, where
hL = max
Π,min
Π
1 + λ
1− υ +
α
c
(
wLAG − cILAG
)
ILAG
 , H

 . (15)
The regulator prevents corruption when h ∈ [hL, H] by paying the corruptible public official
the minimum salary that induces her to report truthfully that the activity is unsafe. When
the fraction of honest public officials grows large or it is more costly to pay the salary to the
public official (i.e., when υ or λ are higher), the threshold hL (weakly) increases and corruption
is tolerated more often. The last term of the interior solution roughly refers to the marginal
welfare return of investment, which is always negative because there is over-investment in a
regime of lenient authorization. Note that, if α = 0, the possibility of engaging in corruption
with the public official does not affect the firm’s investment decision. This is because all the
gains from collusion will be reaped by the public official. Therefore, the threshold hL is optimally
set to take into account only the ex-post welfare benefits of preventing corruption, namely, the
disallowance of unsafe goods, and its welfare costs, associated with the parameter λ.17 When
α > 0, the anticipation of corruption stimulates investment. In that case, the regulator finds
it optimal to prevent corruption more often by lowering the threshold hL so as to mitigate the
over-investment problem.
Strict authorization. In this regime, room for corruption (extortion) arises when there is
conclusive evidence that the good is safe, that is, Π > h. Deterring extortion is not very costly,
though, as the regulator could promise a small reward when the public official reveals that
h ∈ [0,Π]. This is enough to make the extortion threat not credible. To see this, suppose that
the public official obtains conclusive evidence that the activity does not generate substantial
negative externality and she approaches the firm to extract a payment under the threat of
concealing such information. If the firm decides not to give in to the public official’s demand,
the public official will be unwilling to follow through on her threat. Intuitively, she will prefer to
collect the reward the regulator has set for an informative report. Anticipating this, the firm will
never make a side agreement with the public official. Yet, even though preventing extortion does
not entail a noticeable monetary cost, the regulator may in fact prefer to tolerate some degree
of corruption. As shown in Proposition 3, allowing corruption in a regime of strict authorization
might be beneficial in order to mitigate the over-investment problem.
Under strict authorization, the regulator will never pay a positive salary for an uninformative
report, i.e., sSA∅ = 0, or for evidence that the good is safe, i.e., s
SA
h = 0 for all h ∈ (Π, H].
Conversely, the regulator could pay a positive salary when h ∈ [0,Π]. However, we can normalize
17When α = 0, collusion does not affect the firm’s investment decision and the optimal hL is given by:
hL = max
{
Π,min
{
Π
[
1 +
λ
1− υ
]
, H
}}
. (16)
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to zero the wage bill as this salary will be very small. In the following proposition, we determine
the threshold value hS ∈ [0,Π] above which corruption is deterred.18
Proposition 5. In a regime of strict authorization, the regulator sets a positive but small salary
sSAh for all h ∈ [hS ,Π] and sSAh = sSA∅ = 0 otherwise, where
hSAS = min
{
G−1
( ∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
(1− υ)(1− γ)(1− α)
)
,Π
}
. (17)
The regulator is more willing to tolerate corruption when the firm expects to receive a
higher fraction of the return on its investment, that is, the higher the fraction of honest public
officials, the larger the firm’s bargaining power, and the stronger the institutional framework.
This is because all these factors lead to higher investment, thereby making extortion a more
appealing, albeit unorthodox, tool for the benevolent regulator to avoid that the firm devotes
excessive resources to the development of the innovative activity. In contrast, the threshold is
independent of λ, given the small cost that must be borne to thwart extortion.
This subsection has highlighted that the wage policy appears to be more effective under
lenient authorization, where curbing corruption is needed to both reduce excessive investment
and over-production. Conversely, under strict authorization, the regulator may prefer not to use
this instrument even though it may be very cheap.19 This finding may provide an additional
rationale for the lack of monetary incentives to public officials that is observed in the real world.
We caution that preventing corruption through salaries may be very costly in a regime
of lenient authorization. All the more so when raising the funds to pay the public officials
leads to larger inefficiencies (i.e., when λ is higher). Arguably, this is more likely to be the
case in developing countries. There, the cost of implementing an effective wage policy may be
prohibitive. More in general, deterring corruption in this regime requires giving up large rents
to the public officials which may render such instrument politically unappealing.
4.2 Taxes and Regulation
We now assume that the benevolent regulator can commit to a tax t ∈ R+ that a firm must
pay in order to undertake production. The aim of this subsection is to provide some insights on
the relation between the optimal authorization regime and the ability to tailor the tax to the
outcome of the regulatory process.
Lenient authorization. The firm’s investment decision now also depends on the tax:
ILAG (t) = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
[
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− t)g(h)dh+ (1− p)(Π− t) + p(1− υ)α
∫ H
Π
(Π− t)g(h)dh
]
−cI
2
2
,
18As deterring corruption does not entail monetary costs, this assumption that corruption is deterred for h
sufficiently high is without loss of generality.
19Note that if the regulator has to pay a minimum bonus to induce the public official to truthfully report
h ≤ Π, the attractiveness of preventing extortion will be further reduced.
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which yields:
ILAG (t) =
[
1− p(1−G(Π))[1− α(1− υ)]
]
(Π− t)
c
.
Welfare, also expressed as a function of t, is:
WLAG (t) = I
LA
G (t)w
LA
G − c
(ILAG )
2
2
,
where
wLAG =
∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh− pυ
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh.
Note that t is a transfer and, as such, it only affects investment incentives but not the surplus
that can be generated by producing the innovative activity. In Stage 0, the regulator announces
the tax that the firm will have to pay if production takes place. The tax is chosen so as to
maximize welfare and the solution is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. In a regime of lenient authorization, the tax on production is:
tLA =
Eg(h)− pυ
∫ H
Π hg(h)dh− p(1−G(Π))(1− υ)(1− α)Π
1− p(1−G(Π))[1− α(1− υ)] , (18)
where tLA increases in α and decreases in p and υ if wLAG > 0.
The firm will invest only if the activity generates a positive surplus and equilibrium investment
and welfare are:
ILAG (t
LA) = max
{
wLAG
c
, 0
}
; WLAG (t
LA) =

(wLAG )
2
2c , if w
LA
G > 0;
0, if wLAG ≤ 0.
(19)
Welfare is (weakly) increasing in p and (weakly) decreasing in the harmfulness of the activity.
The tax that the regulator may set can be such that the firm is not willing to invest, in
which case overall welfare is 0. This occurs whenever the surplus that the activity is expected
to generate is negative. When the tax is positive in equilibrium, its size is increasing in the
firm’s bargaining power and decreasing in both the fraction of honest public officials and the
accuracy of the signal. A higher α is associated with more investment because the firm will
reap a larger fraction of the gross profits. Then, to curb investment, the regulator increases
the tax in such a way that the equilibrium levels of investment and welfare turn out to be
independent of the distribution of the bargaining power. Like an increase in α, a reduction in
υ stimulates investment and, for this reason, prompts the regulator to increase the tax. On
top of that, a lower υ also reduces the surplus that the activity can bring about, wLAG , as it
increases the probability that an unsafe good is authorized. Welfare in this regime continues to
be increasing in the fraction of honest public officials υ. Lastly, an increase in the precision of
the signal makes it more likely that evidence that the good is unsafe is uncovered and production
prohibited, thereby reducing investment. Accordingly, there is a negative relationship between
signal precision and the equilibrium tax. As the tax allows the regulator to govern the investment
decision, a change in the harmfulness of the activity now only affects surplus. As a result, more
harmful activities unambiguously decrease welfare.
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Strict authorization. The firm’s investment decision as function of the tax is:
ISAG (t) =
pΓG(Π)(Π− t)
c
.
Welfare, also expressed as a function of t, is:
WSAG (t) = I
SA
G (t)w
SA
G − c
(ISAG )
2
2
,
where
wSAG = p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh,
which is independent of t. The tax is chosen in Stage 0 to maximize WSAG (t). The solution is
characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. In a regime of strict authorization, the tax on production is:
tSA = Π− 1
ΓG(Π)
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh, (20)
where tSA increases in Γ. The firm will invest ISAG (t
SA) =
wSAG
c and welfare is:
WSAG (t
SA) =
(wSAG )
2
2c
. (21)
Welfare is increasing in p and decreasing in the harmfulness of the activity.
The tax never deters the firm from producing as the surplus that the activity generates is
never negative in a regime of strict authorization. Once again, the regulator uses the tax on
production to govern the firm’s investment incentives. The tax is inversely related to the gross
profits of production that the firm expects to gain, i.e., the parameter Γ, to ensure that the firm
will not devote excessive resources to investment. Whenever γ < 1 and α < 1, the firm must
pay an indirect tax to the public official to have production authorized. Anticipating this, the
regulator will impose a lower tax burden on the firm. Put differently, there is a substitution
between the indirect tax paid to the public officials and the direct tax paid to the regulator. As
a result, when a tax on production can be imposed, welfare in a regime of strict authorization is
unaffected by the likelihood that corruption takes place. Since the firm is made to pay for the
externality generated by the activity, an increase in the precision of the signal does not give rise
to over-investment but only to a higher surplus. Therefore, an increase in p is welfare enhancing.
In the next proposition, we compare welfare under both lenient and strict authorization when
the regulator can levy a tax on production.
Proposition 6. When the regulator can set a tax on production, a regime of lenient authoriza-
tion is (weakly) preferred to one of strict authorization if and only if:
(1− p)
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh ≥ (1− pυ)
∫ H
Π
(h−Π)g(h)dh. (22)
This condition is more difficult to satisfy when the activity is more harmful.
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The left-hand side of condition (22) captures the differential advantage of lenient authoriza-
tion as compared to strict authorization: Production of safe goods is allowed even when there
is no conclusive evidence of their harm. The right-hand side of (22) represents the downside
of adopting lenient authorization: Unsafe goods may be authorized. This always occurs in the
absence of conclusive evidence (an event which has probability 1−p) and it also happens if there
is evidence that the negative externality outweighs the private benefits but the public official is
corrupt (an event which has probability p(1−υ)). Therefore, lenient authorization is more likely
to be preferred when the fraction of honest public officials in the population is higher. More
harmful activities accentuate the benefits of pursuing a more prudent approach and, accordingly,
make it harder to satisfy inequality (22).
Tax contingent on regulatory evidence. Suppose that the regulator could impose a tax
contingent on both the production decision and the signal collected by the public official. That
is, the tax is conditional on r ∈ {h, ∅}. This does not affect the solution previously described for
the strict authorization regime. There, production is allowed only if there is positive evidence
that the good is safe. The regulator will impose a tax tSAh for all h ∈ [0,Π]. We find that
the regulator may as well set tSAh = t
SA characterized above. Intuitively, the regulator does
not want to prohibit production when Π ≥ h and the tax only affects investment incentives.
Such incentives only depend on the expected tax bill. Therefore, there is no gain from setting a
different tax for a different expected level of harm.
The conclusion is sharply different for the lenient authorization regime because the regulator
can gain from setting tLA∅ 6= tLAh , where tLA∅ is the tax that the innovative firm must pay to
produce the good if there is no conclusive evidence about product safety. The regulator has
an additional instrument it can use to provide the firm with incentives to invest and produce.
The following proposition shows that with such a tax schedule, there is no loss of generality in
restricting attention to a lenient-authorization regime.
Proposition 7. When the tax can be made contingent on both the production decision and the
signal, lenient authorization weakly dominates strict authorization, i.e. WLA ≥WSA.
The intuition for this result is the following. With a lenient authorization regime it is always
possible to replicate the solution under strict authorization by appropriately setting tLA∅ . In
particular, production may be discouraged if the signal is uninformative by setting a very high
tax that the firm will be unwilling to pay. Moreover, if allowing production when evidence is
inconclusive is socially desirable, tLA∅ would be set in such a way that the firm is still willing to
produce in those states, leading to a strict social preference for a regime of lenient authorization.
Discussion. When the regulator can use a tax, the firm can be made to bear some of the
expected social cost that its activity generates. This helps reduce the disadvantages associated
with a regime of lenient authorization. In particular, when the tax can be made contingent on
the signal collected by the regulator, there is no benefit from using strict authorization. If the
risk of producing an unsafe good is too high, the tax can be set in such a way that the firm
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is unwilling to produce when evidence is inconclusive. In that case, welfare is the same under
the two authorization regimes. If the risk is not too high, the tax can be set in a way that the
firm is still willing to undertake production if the evidence is inconclusive and welfare is strictly
higher than under strict authorization.
When the tax can only depend on whether the firm undertakes production or not, the regime
of strict authorization may dominate. This is exactly because the tax cannot be perfectly tailored
to make the firm pay the expected social cost when regulatory evidence is inconclusive. Notably,
the likelihood that the regime of strict authorization is preferred is increasing in the fraction of
corrupt public officials.
In the absence of a tax, the argument for the adoption of a more prudent approach is
stronger: the firm cannot be made to bear the social costs that its activity generates. Therefore,
its incentive to over-invest and over-produce in a regime of lenient authorization cannot be
limited.
4.3 Ex-post Liability
In this subsection, we suppose that the expected harm h ∈ [0, H] is the product of the probability
that an accident occurs, defined η(h) ∈ [0, 1], and the social damage that the accident causes,
D. That is, h = η(h)D. As we keep D fixed, a higher expected externality necessarily means
that η(h) is higher. Our aim is to study how the possibility of imposing fines contingent on the
occurrence of an accident affects investment and welfare in the two regimes and contribute to
the debate on the relationship between ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability.
We assume that courts can fine the firm if an accident occurs but cannot gather evidence on
product safety. Only the regulator and its public officials have the capability of collecting this
evidence.20
Let us begin by considering an institutional setting wherein firms are free to produce in-
novative goods - that is, a regulator cannot collect evidence on the safety of the innovation.
However, if an accident occurs, firms face liability. The social planner can at the very beginning
of the game commit to a fine that the firm will have to pay if there is an accident. Thus, the
envisioned legal regime is one of strict liability.
Specifically, the timing of the game is as follows. At the onset, the social planner commits
to a fine φ the firm will have to pay if an accident occurs. Knowing the fine, the firm makes the
investment and, in the case of a breakthrough, it decides whether or not to produce. Later on,
if an accident occurs, the court imposes the predetermined fine on the firm.
We solve the game backwards and we can distinguish between two main scenarios, depending
on whether or not the fine that can be imposed on the firm is bounded or not. The firm may not
have enough financial resources to cover the entire cost of the disaster and in most jurisdictions
20While other papers in the literature assume that courts can obtain evidence, it is often argued that courts
may be less able to collect information about specific features of technologies or industries than regulators, who
are specialists (e.g., see Schwartzstein and Shleifer, 2013).
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the firm’s resources set a ceiling to the maximum fine which can be imposed on firms.21 The
firm is assumed not to own assets and a natural ceiling to the fine that can be imposed by the
court is represented by the profit that would otherwise accrue to the firm.
When the fine is unbounded, i.e., φ ∈ R+, the benevolent social planner will optimally set
a fine which induces the firm to make the first-best investment and production decisions. This
optimal fine is φ = D. Confronted with such a fine, a firm will find it profitable to produce
only if the activity is expected to be socially beneficial, that is, only if Π > Eg(h). Moreover, at
the investment stage the firm will choose I so as to maximize social welfare. Namely, with the
optimal unbounded fine, the firm is made to internalize the social cost caused by the innovative
good and first-best is achieved.
Unsurprisingly, an environment wherein fines are bounded dramatically limits the effective-
ness of this tool to induce the optimal investment and production decisions. In what follows,
we assume that the firm can pay up to the profit that it has earned if an accident occurs. The
Maximal Punishment Principle (Becker, 1968) applies and the firm will pay Π in the event of an
accident. Such a fine is not enough to always deter the firm from carrying out production when
this is socially undesirable, i.e. when Π ≤ Eg(h). The firm will only partially take into account
the negative social repercussions of production. In other words, investment will be below, and
social welfare will be above, that observed in a regime of laissez-faire. The following proposition
summarizes the optimal fines, investments, and welfare in a regime of ex-post liability.
Proposition 8. When fines are unbounded, φ = D, investment and production decisions are
first-best and, as a result, first-best welfare is achieved. If fines are bounded, φ = Π, there is
over-production and over-investment, and welfare is below first-best.
In a regime of unbounded fines, there is no need for regulation, whereas there might be
scope for regulation when fines are bounded and below we explore the interplay between ex-ante
regulation and ex-post liability.
4.3.1 Ex-ante Regulation and Ex-post Liability.
A regime in which ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability are jointly used to induce the firm to
make more socially desirable investment and production decisions may lead to a higher level of
welfare than a regime where only liability or regulation is employed. This result was shown by
Shavell (1984) in a setting in which a firm must be induced to expend resources to reduce the
probability of an accident.
If regulation and liability coexist, the game unfolds as follows. At the onset, the social
planner announces the fine the firm will pay if an accident occurs. Knowing the fine, the firm
decides how much to invest in R&D. If a breakthrough occurs, the regulator collects a signal
about the good safety. If production is authorized, the firm decides whether to produce the
good or not and, if an accident occurs, the firm will have to pay the announced fine.
21This problem known as judgement proof has been extensively studied in the law and economics literature
(e.g., see Shavell, 1986).
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We focus on fines which are the same within an authorization regime, irrespective of the
evidence and we study how such penalties affect investment incentives and, thereby, welfare.
Given that the fines do not affect production decision, there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to just one fine per regime - what matters for investment decisions is the expected fine
facing the firm. In fact, the fine might as well be contingent on regulatory evidence or the lack
thereof (i.e., r = ∅). However, different results with respect to the case studied here would arise
only if the contingent fine were so high that either the firm would not go ahead with production
when it is ex-post efficient or the two regimes would turn out to be identical.22
The following lemma illustrates the optimal bounded fines in the two regimes.
Lemma 6. In a lenient authorization regime, the optimal fine is:
φLA = min
{
D
(
1− p(1− α)(1− υ)[1−G(Π)]Π
Eg(h)− pυ
∫ H
Π hg(h)dh
)
,Π
}
,
and φLA is weakly decreasing in p.
In a regime of strict authorization, the optimal fine is:
φSA = min
{
D
(
1− (1− Γ)G(Π)Π∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
)
,Π
}
,
and φSA is independent of p and weakly increasing in Γ.
In a regime of strict authorization, the social planner may prefer not to fully confiscate
the firm’s gross profits after a disaster if Γ is very low as this would excessively discourage
investment. Put differently, if the corrupt public officials already extract a large fraction of the
profits, the firm is reluctant to invest and, as a result, there is no need to impose a very large
fine following an accident. In a regime of lenient authorization, the fine is equal to Π unless
p is very high, in which case the social planner may not want to discourage the investment by
setting a fine that is overly high.
The fine improves welfare because the regulator can make the firm (partially) bear the
negative externalities caused by production. However, fines are not as effective as taxes in
aligning private and social interests. The reason is that fines are paid only when an accident
occurs and are limited above by the firm’s assets. In contrast, taxes are paid with certainty when
the firm decides whether or not to undertake production of the innovative good. The following
remark formally proves this claim.
Remark 1. The following inequalities hold:
WLAG (t
LA) ≥WLAG (φLA) ≥WLAG ; WSAG (tSA) ≥WSAG (φSA) ≥WSAG .
22The former case would arise if φ(h) were very high for some r = h and such that the firm decides against
producing even though Π > h. As argued in a previous footnote, this is a circumstance that we do not deal with
in this paper. The latter case would occur if φ(∅) were so high that the firm would not produce if the report is
uninformative. But then lenient and strict authorization regimes would coincide.
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It is easy to show that when the regulator can impose a tax, there is no additional benefit
from using (bounded) fines. Intuitively, ex-post liability does not give rise to additional signals
about product safety and cannot improve the firm’s incentives to invest. For instance, consider
a regime of strict authorization, wherein the optimal tax in the absence of fines induces the firm
to take into account social benefits at the investment stage. If the social planner can set a fine
contingent on the occurrence of the accident, any positive fine would force the firm to bear an
excessive burden. As a result, the problem is over-determined. The same argument applies in
a regime of lenient authorization where the attainable social welfare is unchanged if the social
planner can set a fine. Note also that there is a negative relationship between taxes and fines:
higher fines reduce taxes.
To conclude, when a tax can be imposed, regulation makes liability superfluous. However,
if fines are used, taxes should be commensurately lower and the presence of courts would not
affect the choice of the authorization regime. If the regulator cannot set a tax, fines improve
welfare.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the optimal choice of the authorization regime for goods which
may exhibit negative externalities. We have focused on how regulation can impact on firm’s
investment incentives. We have found that the pros and cons of alternative regulatory regimes
may be critically affected by corruption opportunities. A strict authorization regime always
avoids that socially harmful goods are produced. This comes at the expense of losing the
opportunity to approve production of socially beneficial goods when evidence of their safety is
lacking. This more prudent approach is more likely to be favored over a lenient authorization
regime when activities are more harmful and the likelihood of collecting conclusive evidence is
lower.
Corruption is shown to have a stronger negative impact on a regime of lenient authorization
because the parties may find it profitable to strike an agreement to allow production of socially
harmful goods. This also prompts the firm to devote even more resources to investment. As
a results, corruption exacerbates the two drawbacks of this regime: excessive investment and
production. On the contrary, corruption may even be socially beneficial in a regime of strict
authorization. This occurs because extortion is inconsequential for allocative efficiency but its
anticipation mitigates the firm’s tendency to devote excessive resources to investment in R&D. In
distinguishing between bribery and extortion, Auriol (2006) reaches a conclusion with a similar
flavor for public procurement: bribery undermines allocative efficiency whereas extortion does
not. We extend this result by showing that private investments are furthered by the anticipation
of collusion and discouraged by the expectation of blackmail.
We have mentioned several real-world applications for our analysis: from the approval process
of drugs, vaccines, and dietary supplements to the authorization of new production technologies
which are suspected of adversely affecting the environment. Another topical application con-
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cerns financial regulation. Most customers may have difficulty understanding features of more
sophisticated financial products, which should then be subject to a more stringent authorization
regime: for instance, by authorizing trade opportunities to accredited investors only.23 The
design of consumer financial protection is an active field of research in economics and finance
and centers on financial consumers’ behavioral biases and cognitive limitations and is especially
concerned about its distributional implications (e.g. see Campbell et al., 2011).
Empirically determining how corruption affects regulation is a fascinating research question
that warrants in-depth analyses which goes beyond the scope of the present paper. However,
to provide some suggestive evidence, we correlate two indexes of pharmaceutical regulation
developed by Pezzola and Sweet (2016) (called Monitoring the Private Market and Public Quality
Control), who draw from data originated by the World Health Organization Pharmaceutical
Sector Country Profile 2011 survey,24 with the popular Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
provided by Transparency International for the same year for 73 developed and small countries.
Specifically, Monitoring the Private Market gauges the degree to which each country regulates
the private market for medicines (e.g., whether manufacturers, wholesalers, and pharmacists
must be licensed and are inspected), whereas Public Quality Control assesses the standard of
quality controls (e.g., whether medicines are tested prior to acceptance). Higher values of these
indexes are associated with higher standards in generic markets. We find that the CPI and the
two indexes of regulation are inversely correlated, with values −0.068 and −0.15 (recall that
a lower score in the CPI means that the public sector is perceived as more corrupt).25 These
results are in line with our model which shows that a benevolent regulator should adopt more
stringent regulatory standards when corruption is a more pervasive phenomenon.
23Requirements to be classified as an accredited investors change from one legislation to another. Individual
investors are typically eligible if they have a substantial net worth. In the United States, requirements have been
tightened following the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
24This is a standardized questionnaire in which country representatives report on the status of the national
pharmaceutical situation.
25We also regress the regulatory indexes on corruption. However, the OLS regressions yield coefficients for the
CPI variable which are of the predicted sign but are statistically insignificant, even when adding GDP per capita
as a control. The results can be provided on request.
29
References
Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (2000). The choice between market failures and corruption.
American economic review, pages 194–211.
Anderlini, L., Felli, L., Immordino, G., and Riboni, A. (2013). Legal institutions, innovation,
and growth. International Economic Review, 54(3):937–956.
Auriol, E. (2006). Corruption in procurement and public purchase. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 24(5):867–885.
Ballentine, C. (1981). Sulfanilamide disaster. FDA Consumer magazine.
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political
Economy, 76(2):169–217.
Becker, G. S. and Stigler, G. J. (1974). Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of
enforcers. The Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1):1–18.
Besley, T. and McLaren, J. (1993). Taxes and bribery: the role of wage incentives. The economic
journal, 103(416):119–141.
Calzolari, G. and Immordino, G. (2005). Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international
trade. European Economic Review, 49(1):145–172.
Campbell, J. Y., Jackson, H. E., Madrian, B. C., and Tufano, P. (2011). Consumer financial
protection. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1):91–113.
Dal Bo´, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: a review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2):203–
225.
Estache, A. and Wren-Lewis, L. (2009). Toward a theory of regulation for developing countries:
Following jean-jacques laffont’s lead. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3):729–770.
Harstad, B. and Svensson, J. (2011). Bribes, lobbying, and development. American Political
Science Review, 105(1):46–63.
Hiriart, Y., Martimort, D., and Pouyet, J. (2010). The public management of risk: Separating
ex ante and ex post monitors. Journal of Public Economics, 94(11):1008–1019.
Immordino, G. (2003). Looking for a guide to protect the environment: the development of the
precautionary principle. Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(5):629–644.
Immordino, G. and Pagano, M. (2010). Legal standards, enforcement, and corruption. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 8(5):1104–1132.
Immordino, G., Pagano, M., and Polo, M. (2011). Incentives to innovate and social harm:
Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties? Journal of Public Economics, 95(7):864–876.
30
Immordino, G. and Polo, M. (2014). Antitrust, legal standards and investment. International
Review of Law and Economics, 40:36–50.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1991). The politics of government decision-making: A theory of
regulatory capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4):1089–1127.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. MIT
press.
Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. P.-L. (1995). Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be com-
pensated? The Economic Journal, pages 145–159.
Mulaje, S. S. (2013). Procedure for drug approval in different countries: a review. Journal of
Drug Delivery and Therapeutics, 3(2).
Pezzola, A. and Sweet, C. M. (2016). Global pharmaceutical regulation: the challenge of inte-
gration for developing states. Globalization and health, 12(1):85.
Piller, C. (2018). Hidden conflicts? Science, 361:16–20.
Schwartzstein, J. and Shleifer, A. (2013). An activity-generating theory of regulation. The
Journal of Law and Economics, 56(1):1–38.
Shavell, S. (1984). A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. The Rand
Journal of Economics, 15(2):271–280.
Shavell, S. (1986). The judgment proof problem. International Review of Law and Economics,
6(1):45–58.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations.
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2(2):181–214.
Tirole, J. (1992). Collusion and the theory of organizations. In Advances in Economic Theory,
Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.
Vafa¨ı, K. (2002). Preventing abuse of authority in hierarchies. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 20(8):1143–1166.
Vafa¨ı, K. (2010). Opportunism in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
26(1):158–181.
31
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the effect of a marginal increase in p on investment:
∂ILA
∂p
= −1−G(Π)
c
Π < 0;
an increase in p on welfare has a positive impact. To see this consider that
∂WLA
∂p
=
∂ILA
∂p
[wLA − cILA] + ILA∂w
LA
∂p
.
Note that
∂wLA
∂p
= −
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh > 0,
whereas ∂I
LA
∂p < 0 and so is w
LA − cILA as this equals:
−p
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh− (1− p)
∫ H
0
hg(h)dh.
Therefore, ∂W
LA
∂p > 0.
Consider two distribution of harm on [0, H]: F (·) and G(·) where F (h) conditionally stochas-
tically dominates (csd) G(h) for all h. Then,
ILAg =
[1− p+ pG(Π)]Π
c
≥ [1− p+ pF (Π)]Π
c
= ILAf
because csd implies first-order stochastic dominance and, as a result, G(Π) ≥ F (Π).
As for welfare,
WLAg =
[
(1− p) + pG(Π)
]2
Π
c
Π
2
− 1[
1− p+ pG(Π)
] ((1− p)Eg(h) + p ∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
)
≥
[
(1− p) + pF (Π)
]2
Π
c
Π
2
− 1[
1− p+ pF (Π)
] ((1− p)Ef (h) + p ∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh
) = WLAf
always holds if(
(1− p)Ef (h) + p
∫ Π
0 hf(h)dh
)
[
1− p+ pF (Π)
] ≥
(
(1− p)Eg(h) + p
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
)
[
1− p+ pG(Π)
] (A1)
because [
(1− p) + pG(Π)
]2
Π
c
≥
[
(1− p) + pF (Π)
]2
Π
c
as G(Π) ≥ F (Π). In (A1), note that Ef (h) ≥ Eg(h) and therefore a sufficient condition for
welfare to be decreasing is that: ∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh ≥
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the effect of a marginal increase in p on investment:
∂ISA
∂p
=
G(Π)
c
Π > 0;
an increase in p on welfare has a positive impact only if Π is sufficiently large as compared to
the expected externality generated by the safe activity.
∂WSA
∂p
=
2p[G(Π)]2Π
c
[
Π
2
− 1
G(Π)
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
]
.
This is non-negative if:
Π ≥ 2
G(Π)
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh = 2Eg(h|h ≤ Π).
Consider two distributions of harm on [0, H]: F (·) and G(·) where F (h) conditionally stochas-
tically dominates (csd) G(h) for all h. Then,
ISAg =
pG(Π)Π
c
≥ pF (Π)Π
c
= ISAf
because G(·) > F (·). Considering welfare:
WSAg =
p2[G(Π)]2Π
c
[
Π
2
− Eg(h|h ≤ Π)
]
≥ p
2[F (Π)]2Π
c
[
Π
2
− Ef (h|h ≤ Π)
]
= WSAf ,
because p
2[G(Π)]2Π
c ≥ p
2[F (Π)]2Π
c and
Ef (h|h ≤ Π) ≥Eg(h|h ≤ Π)
⇔ Π−
∫ Π
0 F (h)dh
F (Π)
≥Π−
∫ Π
0 G(h)dh
G(Π)
⇔
∫ Π
0 f(h)dh∫ Π
0 F (h)dh
≥
∫ Π
0 g(h)dh∫ Π
0 G(h)dh
The first step derives from integration by parts, whereas the second step is due to conditional
stochastic dominance.
Proof of Proposition 1
The threshold value of Π above which lenient authorization is preferred to strict authorization
can be retrieved from WLA −WSA ≥ 0. As for the effect of p on this inequality note that the
derivative of the rhs with respect to p yields:
−2
(
G(Π)Eg(h)−
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
)
[
1− p+ 2pG(Π)
]2 ,
which is negative if and only if G(Π)
∫ H
Π hg(h)dh ≥ [1−G(Π)]
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh.
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Consider two distribution of harm on [0, H]: F (·) and G(·) where F (h) ≤ G(h) for all h.
The threshold value of Π above which lenient authorization is preferred to strict authorization
is higher under distribution F (·) than G(·). This is the case only if:
(1− p+ pG(Π))Eg(h) + p
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
1− p+ 2pG(Π) ≤
(1− p+ pF (Π))Ef (h) + p
∫ Π
0 hf(h)dh
1− p+ 2pF (Π) .
After some computations, it is possible to see that the above inequality is satisfied when:
[Ef (h)− Eg(h)][(1− p)2 + 2p2G(Π)F (Π)] + p(1− p)
(∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh−
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
)
+2p2
(
G(Π)
∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh− F (Π)
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
)
+ p(1− p)
[
G(Π)Ef (h)− F (Π)Eg(h)
]
+p(1− p)[G(Π)− F (Π)][Ef (h)− Eg(h)] ≥ 0.
Since Ef (h) ≥ Eg(h) and G(Π) ≥ F (Π) all terms in the above expression are unambiguously
non-negative with the exception of the second. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the threshold
value to increase when activities are more harmful is
∫ Π
0 hf(h)dh ≥
∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh.
Proof of Proposition 2
The inequality can be recovered by setting WLAC −WSAC ≥ 0.
A marginal increase in p positively affects welfare in a regime of strict authorization if the
following inequality holds:
∂WSAC
∂p
=
p
[
γ + α(1− γ)
]
G(Π)Π
c
[
G(Π)Π[2− (γ + α(1− γ))]− 2
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
]
≥ 0
The first term is always positive, whereas the term in the square brackets is non-negative only
if:
Π ≥ 2
2− [γ + α(1− γ)]Eg(h|h ≤ Π).
Note that 22−[γ+α(1−γ)] < 2 and, as a result, the threshold value above which p positively affects
welfare in a regime of strict authorization is lower when public officials are corrupt.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote by the subscript G investment and welfare in this general scenario. Start by considering
a regime of lenient authorization (point a). Investment is chosen so as to maximize the following
ILAG = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I
[
p
∫ Π
0
Πg(h)dh+ (1− p)Π + p(1− υ)α
∫ H
Π
Πg(h)dh
]
− cI
2
2
,
which yields:
ILAG =
[
1− p(1−G(Π))[1− α(1− υ)]
]
Π
c
.
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Welfare is:
WLAG = I
LA
G
[ ∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh− pυ
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wLAG
−c(I
LA
G )
2
2
.
Replacing the investment into the above equation, we easily obtain the welfare attainable with
lenient authorization.
Let us consider the effect of a marginal increase in the fraction of honest public officials on
welfare:
∂WLAG
∂υ
=
∂ILAG
∂υ
wLAG + I
LA
G
∂wLAG
∂υ
− cILAG
∂ILAG
∂υ
,
which is positive when:
ILAG
∂wLAG
∂υ
> −∂I
LA
G
∂υ
[
wLAG − cILAG
]
. (A2)
Notice that the left-hand side is always positive because
∂wLAG
∂υ
= −p
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh > 0,
since h ≥ Π for any h ∈ [Π, H]. Moreover, the right-hand side is negative because
∂ILAG
∂υ
= −αp(1−G(Π))Π
c
< 0,
and
wLAG − cILAG =−
∫ H
0
hg(h)dh+ pυ
∫ H
Π
hg(h)dh+ p(1− α)(1− υ)
∫ H
Π
Πg(h)dh
< −
∫ H
0
hg(h)dh+ p
∫ H
Π
hg(h)dh < 0.
Hence, the inequality in (A2) is always satisfied.
Now consider a regime of strict authorization (part b). Investment is chosen so as to maximize
the following
ISAG = arg max
I∈[0,1]
I[p [υ + (1− υ)(γ(1− α) + α)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
∫ Π
0
Πg(h)dh]− cI
2
2
which yields:
ISAG =
pΓG(Π)Π
c
.
Welfare is:
WSAG = I
SA
G
[
p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wSAG
−c(I
SA
G )
2
2
Welfare is easily obtained from plugging in the investment equation. Let us consider the effect of
a marginal increase in the fraction of honest public officials on welfare under strict authorization:
∂WSAG
∂υ
=
∂ISAG
∂υ
wSAG + I
SA
G
∂wSAG
∂υ
− cISAG
∂ISAG
∂υ
.
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This is positive only if:
ISAG
∂wSAG
∂υ
+
∂ISAG
∂υ
[wSAG − cISAG ].
Now note that
∂wSAG
∂υ = 0 and
∂ISAG
∂υ
=
p(1− α)(1− γ)G(Π)Π
c
> 0,
whereas
wSAG − cISAG = p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh− pΓG(Π)Π > 0
when
Γ >
∫ Π
0 (Π− h)g(h)dh
G(Π)Π
.
Consider two distribution of harm on [0, H]: F (·) and G(·) where the activity identified by
distribution F (·) is more harmful than that identified by distribution G(·). It holds that∫ Π
0 (Π− h)g(h)dh
G(Π)Π
≥
∫ Π
0 (Π− h)f(h)dh
F (Π)Π
,
only if
G(Π)
∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh ≥ F (Π)
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh.
Integrating by parts and rearranging, this holds only if:∫ Π
0 f(h)dh∫ Π
0 F (h)dh
≥
∫ Π
0 g(h)dh∫ Π
0 G(h)dh
,
which is always the case because F (·) conditionally stochastically dominates G(·).
Proof of Lemma 3
Let h2 = h1 + , with h1 ≥ Π and  > 0. The marginal welfare benefit of preventing corruption
when the externality is hi ∈ {h1, h2}:
ILAG
[
p(1− υ)(hi −Π)g(hi)− λpΠg(hi)
]
+
p(1− υ)αΠg(hi)
c
[cILAG − wLAG ].
If g(h2) ≥ g(h1), preventing corruption always gives a higher welfare benefit when the externality
is larger. Now focus on the case in which g(h1) > g(h2). The welfare gain of preventing
corruption is higher in state h2 if
h1g(h1)− h2g(h2)
g(h1)− g(h2) < Π
(
1 +
λ
1− υ −
cILAG − wLAG
cILAG
)
.
The right-hand side is positive under the assumption that, if wLAG were negative, the regulator
would rather ban production of innovative activities than implement a regime of lenient autho-
rization. The left-hand side is negative if h2g(h2) > h1g(h1). Take the limit for → 0, then the
condition holds if g(h1) + h1g
′(h1) > 0, which is always satisfied by Assumption 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The regulator chooses the threshold hL which maximizes welfare:
max
hL∈[Π,H]
WLAG (hL) = max
hL∈[Π,H]
ILAG (hL)w
LA
G (hL)−
c(ILAG (hL))
2
2
,
where
ILAG (hL) =
∫ Π
0 Πg(h)dh+ (1− p)
∫ H
Π Πg(h)dh+ p(1− υ)α
∫ hL
Π Πg(h)dh
c
,
and
wLAG (hL) =
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh+ (1− p)
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh
+p(1− υ)
∫ hL
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh− λpΠ[1−G(hL)].
Note that
∂wLAg
∂hL
= p(1− υ)(Π− hL)g(hL) + λpg(hL)Π
and
∂ILAG
∂hL
=
α
c
p(1− υ)Πg(hL).
Focus on the interior solution. First-order necessary condition for a maximum requires that:
ILAG
[
p(1− υ)(Π− hL)g(hL) + λpg(hL)Π
]
=
p(1− υ)α
c
Πg(hL)[cI
LA
G − wLAG ].
This can be rearranged as:
hL =Π +
λ
1− υΠ +
α
c
Π
(
wLAG − cILAG
)
ILAG
=Π
1 + λ
1− υ +
α
c
(
wLAG − cILAG
)
ILAG
 ,
(A3)
where:
wLAG − cILAG =− p(1− υ)
∫ hL
Π
[h− (1− α)Π]g(h)dh−
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh
− (1− p)
∫ H
Π
hg(h)dh− λpΠ[1−G(hL)].
For the threshold hL determined in (A3) to be a maximum, it must be that the second-order
condition is also satisfied. This condition is:
∂ILAG
∂hL
∂wLAG
∂hL
+
∂2wLAG
∂h2L
ILAG +
∂2ILAG
∂h2L
(wLAG − cILAG ) +
∂ILAG
∂hL
∂(wLAG − cILAG )
∂hL
< 0
⇔ I + ∂I
LA
G
∂hL
αΠ
(
(2wLAG − cILAG )
cILAG
)
> 0,
and it is always satisfied when α = 0 or when 2wLAG − cILAG > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 5
The regulator chooses the threshold hS which maximizes welfare:
max
hS∈[0,Π]
WSAG (hS) = max
hS∈[0,Π]
ISAG (hS)w
SA
G (hS)−
c(ISAG (hS))
2
2
,
Investment in strict authorization is:
ISAG =
p
[
υ
∫ Π
0 Πg(h)dh+ (1− υ)[γ + α(1− γ)]
∫ hS
0 Πg(h)dh+ (1− υ)
∫ Π
hS
Πg(h)dh
]
c
.
Welfare if a breakthrough is achieved is:
wSAG = p
∫ Π
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh,
as extortion does not affect the pool of activities which are approved. First-order condition
yields
− p(1− υ)(1− γ)(1− α)Πg(hS)[wSAG − cISAG ]. (A4)
When wSAG − cISAG < 0, the regulator wants to increase hS , whereas when wSAG − cISAG > 0 the
regulator wants to decrease hS . Note that:
wSAG − cISAG = p(1− υ)(1− γ)(1− α)
∫ hS
0
Πg(h)dh− p
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh.
It is easy to see that, when hS is small, w
SA
G − cISAG < 0 and the regulator wants to increase hS .
The optimal threshold is then given by:
hSAS = min
{
G−1
( ∫ Π
0 hg(h)dh
(1− υ)(1− γ)(1− α)
)
,Π
}
.
That is, the regulator will increase hS up to the point at which w
SA
G = cI
SA
G , if such hS < Π.
Otherwise, the regulator will increase hS up to Π, that is corruption will never be deterred in a
regime of strict authorization. Note that, at the candidate interior optimum, the second order
condition amounts to:
−
[
p(1− υ)(1− γ)(1− α)Πg(hSAS )
]2
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
The equilibrium tax is derived directly from maximizing WLAG (t) with respect to t and setting it
equal to 0. Note that the second order condition holds as
∂ILAG (t)
∂t < 0. Given t
LA, the firm will
invest only if Π > tLA. It is easy to check that this is the case whenever wLAG > 0. Therefore,
if wLAG ≤ 0, the firm will not invest and WLAG (tLA) = 0. In contrast, if wLAG > 0, the firm will
invest and WLAG (t
LA) =
(wLAG )
2
2c .
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The impact of an increase in α on the equilibrium tax, tLA, that is, ∂t
LA
∂α is positive if:
Π
[
1− pυ(1−G(Π))
]
− Eg(h) + pυ
∫ H
Π
hg(h)dh > 0,
which is always satisfied if wLAG > 0.
The impact of an increase in υ on the equilibrium tax, tLA, that is, ∂t
LA
∂υ is negative if:
α(1−G(Π))
∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh−
[
1− p(1− α)(1−G(Π))
] ∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh > 0
which is always satisfied if wLAG > 0 because
1− p(1− α)(1−G(Π))
α(1−G(Π)) > pυ.
The impact of an increase in p on the equilibrium tax, tLA, that is, ∂t
LA
∂υ is negative if:
(1−G(Π))
∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh+
[
υ + α(1− υ)(1−G(Π))
] ∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh < 0
which is always satisfied if wLAG > 0.
If WLAG (t
LA) = 0, a change in p does not affect welfare. Conversely, if WLAG (t
LA) > 0,
∂WLAG (t
LA)
∂p
= −υ
∫ H
Π
(Π− h)g(h)dh > 0.
Compare now two distributions of harm, F (·) and G(·) where the former csd the latter. Notice
that if WLAG (t
LA) > 0, the surplus wLAG,g(t
LA) can be rewritten as:∫ Π
0
G(h)dh+ (1− pυ)
∫ H
Π
G(h)dh− (1− pυ)(H −Π),
which is always higher than wLAG,f (t
LA) becauseG(h) ≥ F (h) for all h. It follows thatWLAG,g(tLA) ≥
WLAG,f (t
LA).
Proof of Lemma 5
The equilibrium tax is derived from the first-order condition of the maximization problem. Note
that the second order condition holds. Given tSA, the firm will always invest a positive amount
equal to
wSAG
c and the overall welfare can be easily retrieved. It is easy to see that the derivative
of tSA with respect to Γ is positive.
It is immediate to see that WSAG (t
SA) is increasing in p. To check that more harmful activities
reduce welfare, compare F (·) and G(·) where F (·) csd G(·). It holds:
ΠG(Π)−
∫ Π
0
hg(h)dh ≥ΠF (Π)−
∫ Π
0
hf(h)dh
⇔ G(Π)
[
Π− Eg(h|h ≤ Π)
]
≥F (Π)
[
Π− Ef (h|h ≤ Π)
]
,
since G(Π) ≥ F (Π) and Ef (h|h ≤ Π) ≥ Eg(h|h ≤ Π).
39
Proof of Proposition 6
Condition (22) is straightforwardly derived by comparing welfare under the two authorization
regimes. To see that (22) is more difficult to satisfy for distribution F (·) which condition-
ally stochastically dominates distribution G(·), note that after some computations (22) can be
rewritten as:
(1− pυ)Π− (1− pυ)H + (1− p)
∫ Π
0
G(h)dh+ (1− pv)
∫ H
Π
G(h)dh ≥ 0.
As F (h) ≤ G(h) for any h, then if (22) is satisfied for distribution G(·), it may not hold for
distribution F (·).
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider a regime of strict authorization. The regulator will set tSAh ≥ 0 for all h ∈ [0,Π]. The
regulator never sets tSAh ≥ Π, for otherwise the firm would not produce in a state where Π ≥ h
and this is ex-post socially inefficient. Hence, the tax only affects the firm’s investment decision,
which solely depends on the expected tax bill. It follows that there is no loss from restricting
to tSAh = t
SA for all h ∈ [0,Π].
Consider now a regime of lenient authorization. The regulator sets tLAh ≥ 0 for all h ∈ [0,Π]
and tLA∅ ≥ 0 when r = ∅. As before, the regulator would always set tLAh ≤ Π not to discourage
production when the good is safe. As this tax only affects investment decisions, there is no
loss of generality to set the same tax for all r = h ∈ [0,Π]. The regulator may set tLA∅ 6=
tLAh . Specifically, by setting t
LA
∅ > Π, the regulator can obtain the same welfare as in strict
authorization because the firm will not produce whenever there is inconclusive evidence. In that
case, tLAh = t
SA. If the regulator sets tLA∅ ≤ Π, the firm will produce whenever the signal in
uninformative. As the tax does not affect production decision, but only investment incentives,
which depend on the expected tax bill, the regulator might as well set tLAh = t
LA
∅ = t
LA.
Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose fines are unbounded. Then, at the investment stage, the firm will choose I ∈ [0, 1] to
max
I
[
Π− φ
∫ H
0
η(h)g(h)dh
]
− cI
2
2
.
The firm’s optimal investment choice as function of the fine is then:
I(f) = max
{
Π− φ ∫ H0 η(h)g(h)dh
c
, 0
}
.
The social planner chooses the fine to maximize:
I(φ)
[∫ H
0
(Π− h)g(h)dh
]
− c[I(φ)]
2
2
.
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If I(φ) > 0, the first-order condition yields:
−
∫ H
0 η(h)g(h)dh
c
[
−
∫ H
0
hg(h)dh+ φ
∫ H
0
η(h)g(h)dh
]
= 0.
Therefore, the optimal unbounded fine is:
φU =
∫ H
0 hg(h)dh∫ H
0 η(h)g(h)dh
= D,
because h = η(h)D. Faced with this fine, firm will produce only if:
Π− φU
∫ H
0
η(h)g(h)dh ≥0
⇔ Π−
∫ H
0
hg(h)dh ≥0.
It follows that investment is first best.
Suppose that the fine is bounded above at φ = Π < D as Π < H = η(H)D and η(H) ≤ 1.
The social planner would set φB = Π. The firm will produce whenever Π ≥ Π ∫ H0 η(h)g(h)dh
and it would follow that investment is above first-best.
Proof of Lemma 6
In a regime of lenient authorization, equilibrium investment as a function of φ is:
ILAG (φ) =
[
1− p(1−G(Π))[1− α(1− υ)]
]
Π
c
− φ
(∫ H
0 η(h)g(h)dh− pυ
∫ H
Π η(h)g(h)dh
c
)
.
Welfare is:
WLAG (φ) = I
LA
G (φ)w
LA
G − c
(ILAG (φ))
2
2
.
The social planner chooses φ ≤ Π to maximize WLAG (φ). In an interior solution, the fine is
derived from the first-order condition:
∂ILAG (φ)
∂φ
[wLAG − cILAG (φ)] = 0.
Since the first term is always negative, the interior solution is derived from wLAG = cI
LA
G (φ). It
is immediate to see that, in the interior solution, the optimal value of φ is decreasing in p.
In a regime of strict authorization, the firm’s investment decision as a function of φ yields:
ISAG (φ) =
pΓG(Π)Π
c
− φ
(
p
∫ Π
0 η(h)g(h)dh
c
)
.
Welfare is:
WSAG (φ) = I
SA
G (φ)w
SA
G − c
(ISAG (φ))
2
2
.
The social planner chooses φ ≤ Π to maximize WSAG (φ). In an interior solution, the optimal
fine is derived from:
∂ISAG (φ)
∂φ
[wSAG − cISAG (φ)] = 0.
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Since the first term is always negative, the interior solution is derived from wSAG = cI
SA
G (φ). It
is immediate to see that, in the interior solution, the optimal value of φ is increasing in Γ and
independent of p.
Proof of Remark 1
Consider first lenient authorization. WLAG (φ
LA) ≥ WLAG follows from φ being chosen to max-
imize WLAG . To show that W
LA
G (t
LA) ≥ WLAG (φLA), suppose that WLAG (tLA) > 0 and the
unconstrained fine can be imposed. In this case, note that:
ILAG (t
LA) =
wLAG
c
= ILAG (φ
LA),
and
wLAG −
cILAG (t
LA)
2
=
wLAG
2
= wLAG −
cILAG (φ
LA)
2
.
Therefore, when the unconstrained solution can be implemented, welfare is the same with the
two instruments. Conversely, if the unconstrained solution cannot be implemented, so that
φLA = Π, then it must be that WLAG (t
LA) > WLAG (φ
LA). The second set of inequalities can be
shown by following the same approach.
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